Trial Court Dismisses and Vacates Libyan Award

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Tuesday, July 1, 2003
Author: 
Bruce Zagaris
Volume: 
19
Issue: 
7
268
Abstract: 
On April 2, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment in favor of a U.S. national against the Libyan Government for a torture claim and vacated and remanded as o the hostage-claim. Sandra Jean Simpson brought her pro se complaint, alleging that Simpson, a U.S. citizen, and her husband, then a permanent resident of the U.S., were passengers on the CARIN II, a cruise ship, cruising through the Mediterranean, when storm interrupted the cruise. On February 10, 1987, Libyan harbor authorities in Benghazi, Libya notified the CARIN that it could use the port as a safe harbor. On February 10, 1987, Libyan authorities boarded the CARIN II and “ forcibly removed” the passengers and crew. Libya held Simpson and her husband captive and threatened to kill them if they tried to leave. Libyan authorities separated Simpson from her husband approximately three months into their captivity. Shortly thereafter, Libya released Simpson but held her husband incommunicado for four more months. On July 21, 2000, Simpson filed a pro se complaint against Libya alleging battery, false imprisonment intentional infliction of emotions distress, loss of consortium, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. On April 19, 2001, Simpson mailed Libya an offer to arbitrate with the condition that the arbitration would “not require [Simpson’s] absence from the United States.” Libya filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of person jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. The case illustrates the U.S. jurisprudence under which U.S. national victims of alleged torture and hostage-taking can maintain suits. It also indicates the developing international jurisprudence generally for international human right law. The case also illustrates the strategy taken by Libya to defend this case, as opposed to simply allowing a default judgment, as many foreign states do.